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Has September 11 Affected 
New York City’s Growth 
Potential?
he terrorist attack on the World Trade Center claimed 
close to 3,000 lives and caused billions of dollars in 
property damage. In the aftermath, New York City’s economy 
contracted briefly but sharply: many businesses were forced to 
shut down, mostly temporarily, and tens of thousands of 
workers were either dislocated for a short time or lost their jobs 
(Bram, Orr, and Rapaport 2002). The economic implications 
for the city, however, clearly extend beyond the first few 
months following the attack.
In this article, we analyze the effects of September 11 on the 
longer run prospects for the New York City economy. We find 
that, on the one hand, several downside risks to the city’s 
growth outlook have arisen. In a worst-case scenario, the 
concentration of the attack on Lower Manhattan has raised the 
possibility that financial firms might relocate outside the city, 
which could generate a cumulative downward spiral of job and 
income growth. On the other hand, the city’s industrial 
structure and its quality-of-life amenities—namely, an 
industrial mix weighted toward high-growth sectors and an 
environment desirable to workers and firms—suggest 
favorable economic prospects. However, whether or not these 
prospects translate into actual growth going forward depends 
to a large degree on the city’s policy response to the economic 
pressures arising from the attack. The key elements of this 
response will be the ability to avoid budgetary decisions that 
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• Over the past three decades, New York City’s 
economy has shown many signs of strength, 
including increased worker earnings and rising 
land prices.
• Although the attack caused a sharp temporary 
disruption in the economy, an advantageous 
industry mix—one weighted toward high-
paying, rapidly expanding industries—is likely 
to keep the city well positioned for growth 
over the medium term. 
• Still, if the city is to translate favorable prospects 
into actual growth, it must maintain an 
environment that is attractive to firms and 
workers. Thus, it must rebuild its damaged 
infrastructure and close a sizable budget deficit 
without letting services deteriorate or taxes
rise too high.  
• Preliminary evidence suggests that the demand 
for New York City property remains robust. 
Continued strength in land prices will be an 
important measure of the city’s growth.
Jason Bram, Andrew Haughwout, and James Orr
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reduce the long-run attractiveness of a New York City location 
and, through rebuilding, to maintain the productivity of the 
city’s capital stock.
We begin by describing recent earnings and land price 
trends in the city. To help interpret these data, we apply a 
model that emphasizes the importance of local property 
markets as an indicator of trends in a mature urban economy. 
The New York experience is then discussed in relation to the 
model, and the city’s economic strengths and weaknesses both 
before and after the attack are evaluated. We also identify 
several challenges that local policymakers will face if the city is 
to recover fully. Finally, our study presents evidence on land 
prices after September 11 indicating that a strong demand for 
New York City property still exists.
Growth Trends in New York City
Three important patterns characterize the trends in the New 
York City economy over the past three decades: steady but 
cyclical employment, rising real earnings, and appreciating 
land prices.
Economic growth at the national level is usually measured 
as the average annual rate of expansion of real (inflation-
adjusted) GDP over some period. At the city level, however, an 
official output measure is not available and thus growth is often 
measured as the trend rate of growth in jobs and/or real 
income. Although in many localities these measures move 
together, the measures in New York City present different 
perspectives on the process of economic growth. Average total 
employment in the city essentially has been unchanged for 
three decades (Chart 1). Even with the rapid expansion of jobs 
in the mid-to-late 1990s, only in 1999 did total employment 
exceed its previous cyclical peak, in 1989. Indeed, the all-
time peak level of total employment was reached in 1969. 
In contrast, real earnings of city workers have trended upward 
since 1980 at an average annual rate of about 3.5 percent.
New York’s pattern of steady employment and rising real 
earnings is attributable to occupational and industrial 
restructuring. Average earnings in the city have risen because of 
accelerating productivity growth in existing jobs and a shift 
toward higher paying jobs. During the 1980s, the expansion of 
jobs in the high-paying FIRE (finance, insurance, and real 
estate) sector helped raise average real earnings citywide. Many 
of these job gains were temporarily reversed in the recession of 
the early 1990s. However, the city’s recovery since the mid-
1990s, in conjunction with the job expansion in some relatively 
high-paying service sectors, again boosted real earnings.
Over this same period, earnings per job increased nation-
wide, but New York’s earnings per job rose even more rapidly 
(Chart 2). Thus, the city increased its earnings relative to the 
rest of the country by enhancing the productivity of existing 
employment and capturing a rising share of high-productivity 
jobs.
Three important patterns characterize the 
trends in the New York City economy over 
the past three decades: steady but 
cyclical employment, rising real earnings, 
and appreciating land prices.
The city increased its earnings relative to 
the rest of the country by enhancing the 
productivity of existing employment and 
capturing a rising share of high-
productivity jobs.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 83
Ratio: New York City to United States
Chart 2
Relative Earnings per Worker in New York City
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (earnings); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (total employment).









00 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 74 72 70 1969
Index of relative house prices: 1976 =100
Chart 3
New York City Area House Prices Relative
to U.S. Average
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York calculations.
Notes: The index is based on the ratio of the repeat-sales price
measure for existing single-family homes in the New York City metro
area to that of the United States overall; the index is designed to
control for changes in the mix of homes sold. Data for the city itself
are not available, so we present the index for the New York City
primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA), which consists of the
city’s five boroughs (the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and
Staten Island) and Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties in
New York State. Approximately 80 percent of the population of the
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Furthermore, the price of housing in New York has also 
risen relative to the nation since 1976 (Chart 3). Here, we use 
the repeat-sales price index, which controls for the quality of 
the structure, as a measure of price change. Constant-quality 
housing price changes provide a relatively clean measure of the 
attractiveness of the bundle of local traits available to residents 
of these homes. These data indicate that the price of residing in 
New York has climbed relative to the rest of the nation—with 
a particularly sharp rise in the second half of the 1990s.
Modeling Growth in a Mature City
To analyze the effects of the terrorist attack on the New York 
City economy, we adopt the model of urban economies 
developed by Roback (1982) and refined in Blomquist, Berger, 
and Hoehn (1988), Gyourko and Tracy (1991), and 
Haughwout (2002). In this framework, metropolitan areas are 
viewed as small, open economies to which labor and capital are 
elastically supplied (see the box for more details on the model). 
Since each city is just one of many places where firms and 
households may choose to locate, it must offer competitive 
levels of profit for firms and utility for households. The value of 
a city to firms and households determines their “bids” in the 
city’s local land and labor markets. Thus, if a location has fixed 
characteristics that are extremely productive, firms will offer 
high bids for sites and high wages to attract workers there. 
Locations may vary in their attractiveness to firms for a variety 
of reasons, ranging from access to valuable existing infra-
structure stocks to proximity to markets or sources of raw 
materials.
Given this set of productive amenities, firms will relocate if 
wages and/or land prices are too high for them to make 
equilibrium profits. If costs are so low that incumbent firms 
can make excess profits, new firms will enter, bidding up local 
prices. A similar logic applies to households. In a mixed 
economy that provides sites for households as well as firms, 
local land and labor prices are determined by the satisfaction of 
firm and household equilibrium conditions. The local price 
equilibrium is thus attained when no firm or household wishes 
to relocate.
When a city’s productive or residential environment 
changes over time, such changes will be reflected in local prices. 
Improvement in a city’s appeal to firms and/or households will 
lead to a rise in relative land prices over time.1 When a city’s 
attractiveness is at its highest to firms (for instance, if taxes paid 
by firms fall but nothing else changes), wages will tend to rise. 84 Has September 11 Affected New York City’s Growth Potential?
Exhibit 1
Wage and Land Rent Equilibrium
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Exhibit 2
Wage and Land Rent Equilibrium
with Fewer Amenities
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Free mobility means that firms and households must pay, albeit 
indirectly, for attractive local characteristics. Firms and households 
pay for local amenities through higher land prices and wages. Thus, 
when a place offers household amenities like an attractive climate 
or unique consumption opportunities, households will be willing 
to pay to locate near these amenities, bidding more for land there. 
Yet, since wages represent an income source to households, they 
will also be willing to accept lower wages to locate in places with 
features they value. If a place is a “bargain” to households in the 
sense that its land prices are low and its wages are high relative to 
its attractive amenities, households will move in, bidding land 
prices up and wages down. Firms, however, bid more for attractive 
sites in both land and labor markets.
Exhibit 1 presents equilibrium land and labor bids by a 
competitive firm (labeled  ) and a representative household 
(labeled  ) for a place with a given set of production and 
consumption amenities ( ). Note that the firm curve (an isoprofit 
curve in the price space) is downward-sloping, indicating that as 
wages in a jurisdiction rise, land rents must fall if firms are to remain 
profitable. The household indifference curve in the price space is 
labeled V, and it slopes upward: higher wages are associated with 
higher land prices. With higher incomes, households must pay higher 




bidding in local land and labor markets. The point where both the 
firm and household equilibrium curves intersect is the local price 
equilibrium ( ,  ).
Exhibit 2 depicts the effect of a change in local amenities (to 
) on this equilibrium. When a city becomes less attractive 
to firms, the   curve shifts downward. Changes that reduce 
the attractiveness of a location to households will shift the   
function downward. For given wage levels, firms and households 
are willing to pay less for land in unproductive places. Note that a 
reduction in attractiveness has an unambiguously negative effect 
on land prices, but that the effect on wages will depend on which 
curve (household V or firm  ) shifts more. When firms are 
disproportionately hurt by a change, the fall in equilibrium land 
rents will be accompanied by a reduction in wages. A relatively large 
impact on households would lead to increases in wages, as house-
holds demand higher compensation to induce them to reside and 
work in an unattractive, low-amenity place.a
aHaughwout (2002) formally derives these comparative statics and 
provides an example of the use of wage effects in the determination 
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When households receive the lion’s share of the benefits of an 
amenity change (perhaps a costless reduction in the rate of 
violent crimes), relative wages would be expected to fall.
Wage and land price data for New York City indicate that 
the trends prior to September 11 were favorable, as both wages 
and relative land prices had been increasing over long and short 
horizons (Charts 2 and 3). Land price increases are a sign of 
growing attractiveness to firms and/or households, while wage 
increases indicate that businesses increasingly value a New 
York location relative to households. Interpretation of the wage 
increases observed in the city, however, is also confounded by 
the change in the population’s characteristics over time, as we 
shall discuss.
Prices of housing and land, both of which are durable assets, 
reflect not just current conditions, but also market participant 
views of a location’s future. The demand for a property is 
determined by the present value of the stream of net benefits 
expected to accrue to the property over its lifetime. When an 
individual purchases a piece of real property, he or she must 
evaluate future conditions in the area where the property is 
located. If conditions are expected to deteriorate next year, or 
in five years, then purchase prices this year will be reduced, as 
the stream of returns into the future falls. Relative property 
prices in any period thus indicate, in part, expected future 
conditions in that location. Note that this predictive power of 
property prices does not extend to either property rentals or 
wages—both of which reflect current conditions or, more 
precisely, conditions expected to pertain to the duration of the 
contract.
Our discussion provides some insight into the sources of the 
apparent land market strength in New York City. Among the 
factors explored in some detail in the academic literature are 
changes in local fiscal policies, such as a fall in local taxes 
without compensating service decreases or an increase in local 
infrastructure provision. On the household side, safety from 
crime, the quality of the public educational systems, and taxes 
are all considered important factors determining local quality 
of life and thus local land and labor prices (see Blomquist, 
Berger, and Hoehn [1988] and Gyourko and Tracy [1991]). 
Measured by several of these factors, conditions in New York 
have improved over the past thirty years, with especially sharp 
improvements occurring in the past decade.
Applying the Model to New York City
Here, we extend the model presented above to account for the 
various types of firms and households that are locating in a 
modern economy.
The model dramatically simplifies the structure of mature 
real-world economies, wherein many kinds of firms and 
households coexist, particularly in urban areas. As a practical 
matter, the way that firms and households sort themselves over 
space is relevant as an indicator of both evaluations of locations 
and the prospects of particular areas. Thus, the fact that New 
York’s relative (constant-quality) home values have increased 
significantly versus those of the nation indicates that the city 
has become more attractive to households and/or firms over 
the past few decades.2
Still, the benefits of a New York City location are clearly not 
the same to all actors in the economy. New York’s industrial 
and demographic structures differ from those of the nation 
because some groups are willing to pay more than others for 
the city’s particular amenities. Most obviously, New York’s 
long domination of financial services employment provides 
significant incentives for firms in that industry to locate there.3 
But this same feature is less attractive to producers in, say, the 
automotive industry. Examples of the city’s critical household 
amenities include relatively easy access to high-skill service 
employment opportunities and a diverse set of consumption 
opportunities such as theaters, museums, and other cultural 
offerings. However, the city’s public schools, by most criteria, 
fall short of their suburban counterparts on several crucial 
dimensions.4
The fact that New York’s appeal as measured by its relative 
land prices is near an all-time high seems to be contradicted by 
population and employment figures that have fallen relative to 
the nation. However, New York’s situation is more complex 
than simple figures demonstrate: the city has substituted high-
paying, high-productivity jobs in a few industries for low-skill, 
low-paying jobs in others. On the household side, corres-
ponding changes in the composition of the local population 
have also tended to support a strong housing market, as we 
shall explain.
Clearly, the city’s future depends on the growth prospects of 
the types of firms and households that have revealed a 
preference for New York. If, for example, the nation’s financial 
services industry were expected to decline significantly, the 
city’s concentration of these jobs would become a liability 
rather than an asset. Likewise, if concentrations of high-skill 
individuals or immigrants were detrimental to employment or 
population growth, the city’s prospects would be dimmed.
New York’s future—and the effect of events such as 
September 11—will therefore depend on the answers to two 
important questions:
• Can New York continue to provide the amenities valued 
most by those industries vital to its economy?86 Has September 11 Affected New York City’s Growth Potential?
Crimes per thousand residents
Chart 4
Annual Crime Rate of New York City
and the United States
Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation; New York State Division 
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• Will the industries that benefit most from these 
amenities continue to thrive at the national level?
Our analysis suggests that the answers point to favorable 
prospects for New York City, although the future will not be 
without policy challenges. Our evidence indicates that New 
York is increasingly specialized in the production of skill-
intensive services and in the provision of residences for high-
skill workers and immigrants. These factors have supported 
rising land prices and wages in the city over the past three 
decades.5
The City’s Growth Fundamentals
According to the model we employ, the desirability of a city 
springs from its productive and residential amenities. We begin 
our discussion of New York City’s growth fundamentals by 
highlighting two key improvements over the past two decades 
that have made the city attractive to firms and workers: an 
improved fiscal position and a reduced crime rate. These 
improvements reflect both explicit policy choices and a 
healthier local economy. Next, we examine the associated 
changes in the city’s industry and population mixes by 
reviewing the city’s industrial structure and considering the 
medium-term prospects for these industries. Trends in the 
financial services sector are emphasized, because its fortunes 
exert a strong influence on the city’s overall performance. We 
find that the local economy tends to have a relatively high 
concentration of industries expected to lead the nation in 
growth over the next decade. Finally, by profiling the changes 
in the local labor force, we find a more advanced educational 
profile in the city than in the nation as a whole—an advantage 
that has increased over the past ten years.
New York’s Productive and Residential 
Environments
Both firms and households have benefited from the dramatic 
improvements in the city’s financial condition since 1975, 
when New York experienced its most severe fiscal crisis since 
the Great Depression. The city has substantially reduced its 
reliance on debt finance, lowered property taxes, and enhanced 
its financial reporting since then (Haughwout 1997). Although 
the overall tax burden remains high, the share of the local tax 
dollar used to service short-term debt has been sharply 
reduced. Improvements in the city’s public transportation 
system, particularly during the 1990s, also have presumably 
benefited firms and households.
Public safety is another key aspect of a location’s 
attractiveness. In that regard, New York’s crime rate tells a 
compelling story (Chart 4). The rate, which actually rose 
during the economic boom of the 1980s, began a steady and 
steep decline in 1991 (amidst one of the city’s worst recessions) 
that continued through the end of the decade. Although the 
1990s saw a downward trend in crime nationwide and the city’s 
improving economy clearly helped to lower the crime rate, 
New York’s decline in crime was even more pronounced. 
Moreover, neighborhood-specific data from New York City 
suggest that the sharpest declines in crime over this period 
tended to occur in the poorest areas and highest crime areas. 
The U.S. Census Bureau’s periodically conducted New York 
City Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS)—which includes a 
resident-reported measure of “neighborhood quality”—
indicates that city dwellers perceived significant improvements 
in crime in their own areas, with the sharpest improvements 
noted in the poorest neighborhoods.
Although these improvements in the business and 
residential environments have helped to enhance relative land 
and labor prices, New York’s portfolio of amenities is not 
without certain liabilities. Perhaps the most important of these 
are the city’s relatively high taxes on residents and businesses, 
and public schools that fall short of suburban competitors. 
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that these liabilities have 
been outweighed by improvements in recent decades.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 87
New York City earnings growth 
Chart 5
Earnings Growth by Industry: United States
versus New York City, 1995-2000
Sources: New York State Department of Labor; U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Industries above the diagonal line registered faster earnings 
growth in New York City than they did nationally; those below the line 
experienced below-average growth in New York City. The dark circles 
represent selected two-digit Standard Industrial Classification
industries that are important to the New York City economy.




















A city’s industry mix indicates which sectors benefit most from 
its particular package of amenities and helps determine 
medium-term growth prospects. New York has long had a 
significant concentration of employment in the financial 
services industry. Firms in this sector appear to strongly value 
proximity to one another, implying that New York’s main 
advantage in this sector has promoted its growth over the past 
several decades.6
In addition, areas with a high concentration of growth 
industries tend to benefit from trends in the broader economy. 
Accordingly, we examine New York City’s current industry 
mix, which has resulted in part from the aforementioned 
changes in the city’s environment. We find that the current mix 
is strongly weighted toward growth sectors. By comparing the 
performance of these industries in the city with their national 
counterparts, we find that most local industries have tended to 
lag moderately in terms of income growth but fairly substan-
tially in terms of job growth. This finding is consistent with 
the model of New York City as a mature economy, with less 
potential for expansion than most parts of the nation—if for 
no other reason than land and space constraints.
In recent years, industries with a high concentration in New 
York City have tended to register relatively brisk job growth at 
the national level and are projected to continue doing so over 
the next decade. In particular, the securities, business services, 
motion picture, legal, social, educational, and management 
services industries have all registered solid job and earnings 
growth at the national level, and their attraction to New York 
City has contributed to strong overall gains for the city. 
Conversely, the industries with the weakest trends in employ-
ment and earnings—almost all of which are in the 
manufacturing sector—are, for the most part, currently 
underrepresented in New York City. One notable exception is 
apparel manufacturing, which, though far less important than 
it was a few decades ago, is still one of the city’s key industries.
Here, we illustrate the overall net effects of these industry 
dynamics by separating out the marginal effects of local factors 
and industry mix on overall income and job growth. Specifically, 
we decompose the differential between local and national 
growth into two components. Local-factor effects represent the 
performance of local industries compared with their national 
counterparts; these effects represent the portion of the overall 
growth differential not explained by local industry mix. 
Industry-mix effects represent what the differential would be if 
local job growth matched national job growth exactly within 
each industry; these effects represent the extent to which 
growth is enhanced or diminished by virtue of the local area’s 
particular industry mix.
We conduct this exercise by first looking at changes in 
earnings over the 1995-2000 period to gauge the dynamics of 
the city’s recent economic boom. Chart 5 presents local relative  
to national earnings growth for most two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification industries, with selected key industries 
highlighted. As we see, some industries (those above the line) 
grew faster locally than they did nationally, while others (those 
below the line) grew more slowly. On balance, though, New 
York City’s industries lagged their national counterparts in 
growth by an estimated 0.6 percentage point. However, 
because some of the nation’s fastest-growing industries were 
In recent years, industries with a high 
concentration in New York City have 
tended to register relatively brisk job 
growth at the national level and are 
projected to continue doing so over 
the next decade.88 Has September 11 Affected New York City’s Growth Potential?
Location quotient (ratio scale)
Chart 6
Projected U.S. Job Growth in 2000-2010
versus New York City Concentration
Sources: New York State Department of Labor; U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank
of New York calculations.
Notes: A location quotient is a measure of local industry concentration.
It is defined here as an industry’s share of employment in New York 
City divided by its national share. For example, the securities industry 
accounts for 4.9 percent of jobs in New York City, but only 0.57 percent
of jobs nationwide, so its location quotient is 4.90/0.57=8.6. Thus, this 
industry’s share of New York City employment is 8.6 times the U.S. 
average. The dark circles represent the chief two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification industries in New York City.















overrepresented locally, New York City benefited dispropor-
tionately from its industry mix, as aggregate earnings growth 
was boosted by an estimated 2.3 percentage points (see table).
In terms of employment growth between 1995 and 2000, 
these effects were somewhat less pronounced, but they 
generally worked in the same direction. Here, positive 
industry-mix effects fully offset negative local-factor effects, 
leaving overall local job growth on a par with that of the nation. 
Over this five-year period, the local-factor effect in earnings per 
job was very near zero. That is, all of the city’s relative growth 
in earnings per job was attributable to industry mix.
To gauge the likely impact of industry mix going forward, 
we performed a similar analysis using Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projected job growth rates by industry. The projected 
rates are for 2000-2010; comparable rates would presumably 
apply for 2002-12. Although we cannot predict local-factor 
effects, based on this information, industry-mix effects should 
continue to contribute positively, albeit modestly, to local job 
growth, as demonstrated in the table. As Chart 6 illustrates, 
industries with above-average expected job growth tend to be 
more concentrated in the city than those with subpar growth or 
job losses. Still, to the extent that local industries continue to 
lag their national counterparts in job growth, it is unclear 
whether local job growth would keep pace with the national 
average.
Because New York City has been moving toward increas-
ingly high-value-added (and high-salary) industries and 
businesses over time, a comparison of local employment trends 
with corresponding national trends tends to understate the 
city’s true relative performance. In fact, a study by McCarthy 
and Steindel (1997) points to the metropolitan region’s 
persistently strong income growth as an indication of healthy 
demand for its goods and services. The authors argue that if 
income is holding up fairly well, then spending on regionally 
produced goods and services is high and business in the region 
may be more robust than the employment data suggest. As 
depicted in Chart 2, average earnings per worker have 
consistently grown more strongly in New York City than 
nationwide; between 1995 and 2000, this growth was due 
entirely to industry mix. If these long-standing trends persist, 
New York City should continue to fare better in terms of 
income growth than in job growth.
Looking forward, we note that to the extent that local-factor 
effects on earnings and employment remain neutral or small—
a condition that depends on New York City remaining an 
attractive site for business locations—the city may be expected 
to continue its long-standing pattern of rising earnings and 
cyclical but steady employment. Were city conditions to 
deteriorate, however, the positive industry-mix effect could be 
insufficient to offset large, negative local-factor effects in 
employment and even earnings per job. The role of the terrorist 
attack in this scenario is discussed later.














National growth 7.1 2.5 4.5 1.7
Local-factor effect -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 —
Industry-mix effect +2.3 +0.5 +1.7 +0.3
Local growth
 (New York City) 8.8   2.5    6.1 —
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 89
The Financial Sector
New York City has a favorable and diverse industry mix—at 
least within the service sectors—yet financial services stands 
out as a key sector driving the local economy. The securities 
industry alone accounted for 5 percent of city employment in 
2000 and an estimated 20 percent of city earnings. These shares 
were higher than they were at any point in history and roughly 
eight times the respective U.S. figures. Not surprisingly, then, 
trends in the financial sector dominate the local economic 
landscape. In fact, a recent study (Bram and Orr 1999) finds 
that cycles in the financial sector—particularly the securities 
industry—tend to presage cycles in the broader local economy.
Accordingly, the steep contraction in Wall Street 
employment over the past year—driven by the national 
recession, particular weakness in the financial markets, and the 
September 11 attack—is a matter of serious concern and 
appears to pose the greatest threat to the city’s medium-term 
growth prospects. The fact that securities employment has also 
fallen, albeit somewhat less sharply, in the rest of the country 
suggests that these job losses reflect a combination of industry- 
and city-specific factors. Financial services will be an important 
sector to monitor when gauging the overall health not only of 
Lower Manhattan, but also of the broader regional economy. 
Over the longer term, the Internet and general advances in 
information and communications technology are likely to 
continue to have important effects on the broad structure of 
the financial services industry (see Orr and Rosen [2000] for a 
more complete discussion).
Labor Force Composition
New York City’s population growth accelerated over the 
past decade. According to the decennial U.S. census, the city’s 
population grew 9.4 percent during the 1990s—the strongest 
growth since the 1920s. Moreover, adjacent counties across the 
metropolitan area also saw increasingly brisk gains. Because 
New York City’s economy tends to be a major hub of 
information-based industries, the metropolitan area’s labor 
force, not surprisingly, has a much higher proportion of 
college graduates than the nation overall. Much of the area’s 
highly educated population resides in the suburbs, but the city 
itself has attracted a very well-educated workforce. In the city 
proper, an estimated 30.5 percent of adults are college 
graduates—a share well above the national average of 
25.2 percent. More important, though, is the change in 
educational attainment: in 1991, just 22.1 percent of New York 
City adults were college graduates, only slightly more than the 
national figure of 21.4 percent.7 This indicates that New York 
is growing in attractiveness as a residential location for well-
educated Americans. Because high concentrations of well-
educated residents are beneficial to urban growth (Rauch 
1993), this component of the city’s population base is a positive 
factor for its future prosperity. In addition, the city is home to 
many immigrants, presumably because of its historical role as 
an immigration gateway. Although the effect of large stocks of 
immigrants on local labor markets is unclear, recent research 
suggests that these individ-uals tend to support a vigorous 
housing market (Saiz 2002). Thus, a reduction in immigration 
to the United States would disproportionately affect New York, 
if only in terms of population growth.
In sum, our empirical examination of New York City’s 
changing industry and population mix shows the city to be 
attractive to those industries that benefit from its productive 
amenities and to a relatively highly skilled and highly educated 
labor force. These results are consistent with the model of a 
mature urban economy as well as with the rising land prices 
and real wages observed in the city over the past two decades.
Although the city is currently well positioned for growth 
over the medium term, the aftermath of September 11 could 
disturb this equilibrium. For example, a change in the 
medium-term industrial outlook is possible, but it does not 
appear likely at this time. A more likely factor that could affect 
this equilibrium is the city’s policy response to the economic 
pressures arising from the attack. The task now faced by New 
York City is to restore and maintain the productive amenities 
and attractive environment for both firms and workers.
Policy Challenges after September 11
Although the city’s industrial and population structures on 
September 10 were favorable for its continued prosperity, the 
loss of life and property on September 11 represents a journey 
into uncharted waters. Accordingly, we now explore certain 
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effects of the attack in more detail and examine whether the 
specific types of damage to the city’s economy might jeopardize 
its future. In the language of the model described earlier, the 
attack most likely induced shifts in the household and firm 
curves. But how large were these shifts, and what role can policy 
play in restoring the city to its pre-attack equilibrium? To 
answer these questions, we consider the future policy 
implications and challenges for the city in terms of its finances, 
its infrastructure, and the subsequent federal aid package.
Closing the City’s Budget Deficit
The September 11 attack caused a significant short-run fiscal 
drain on the city. Although it is difficult to isolate the attack’s 
effect on New York City’s tax revenue, city agencies estimate 
that the attack will have reduced revenue by 3 percent to 
7 percent in fiscal year 2001-02 and by 2 percent to 6 percent 
in fiscal year 2002-03.8  Although the losses represent a sizable 
shock to the city’s revenue stream, they are considerably less 
severe than the losses faced by the city during its 1975 fiscal 
crisis. In 1975, the city had to refinance a net cash deficit of 
more than 25 percent of total tax revenue. The city revenue 
costs of the September 11 attack are much more in line with the 
reversal in the city and national economies in fiscal year 1990. 
That year, revenues from the city’s four major taxes (personal 
income, sales, property, and general corporation) fell 
approximately 0.5 percent after having grown by more than 
3.7 percent the previous year—a swing of 4.2 percent in 
revenue growth rates (Haughwout 1997). Thus, the tax revenue 
shortfall related to September 11 is of a magnitude similar to 
the effects of the city’s 1990 recession.
Revenue shortfalls of this magnitude require concerted 
action to avoid ending the fiscal year with a deficit. In New 
York, deficit spending led to the severe fiscal crisis of 1975; 
since then, the city has been under a strict balanced budget 
regime. In 1990, faced with a shortfall of similar magnitude, the 
city raised personal income tax rates sharply to bring the 
budget into balance in fiscal year 1991. Today, the issue facing 
city officials is how to react to the current shortfall, which has 
been compounded by the effects of the recession and declines in 
equity markets. The historical pattern in New York has been to 
raise taxes to close budget gaps, and this is indeed the quickest 
way to generate cash. However, tax increases—particularly at 
this point in time—may be costly in the long run.
Recent research into the relationship between tax rates, 
bases, and revenues in four U.S. cities, including New York, 
indicates that these cities are very near the top of their local 
“revenue hills” (Haughwout et al. 2000). This means that 
increases in tax rates can reduce the base over time in such a 
way as to generate very little additional revenue in the long run. 
Instead, they may distort the local economies, leading to 
various forms of tax avoidance, especially the loss of economic 
activity to other jurisdictions.
Therefore, although tax increases could help close the city’s 
current budget gap in the short run, they might well come at a 
substantial long-run cost, as higher taxes would make the city a 
less attractive location for mobile firms and households. 
Haughwout et al. assert that the deleterious effects of city tax 
increases can extend beyond the tax base by also reducing the 
size of the real economy and the job base. Such a reduction in 
the job base, unlike the temporary displacement of jobs from 
the September 11 attack itself, could last for the duration of the 
tax increases. Of course, temporary tax increases might have 
smaller and less durable effects.
The first policy challenge for the city, then, is to close its 
current budget gaps at the least possible cost to its long-term 
vitality. The alternative to tax increases, of course, is expendi-
ture reductions, themselves costly. In addition, it may be viable 
for New York City to obtain federal and state aid to help it 
through this difficult period.
Rebuilding Damaged and Destroyed 
Infrastructure
Compounding the fiscal problems facing the city and its 
residents is the fact that a significant part of the damage to Lower 
Manhattan was sustained by public facilities, notably the Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) train station in the World 
Trade Center. In addition, some streets and city subway lines 
were heavily damaged. These facilities allow Lower Manhattan to 
function as an employment center for the city and the region. 
Without ready access to Lower Manhattan, one of the city’s 
growth engines—the financial services and related industries 
concentrated around Wall Street—is cut off from the rest of the 
region.
More generally, evidence from the academic literature 
indicates that the productivity of city public capital (that is, its 
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value to firms) is modest, but positive. Eberts (1990) and 
Haughwout (2002), for example, estimate output elasticities of 
around 0.04, meaning that a loss of 1 percent of a city’s public 
capital stock is associated with a 0.04 percent decline in city 
productivity. Interestingly, household costs are estimated to be 
somewhat higher, yielding a total land price elasticity of about 
0.12. These figures suggest that infrastructure stocks exert a 
significant influence on a city’s attractiveness.
Initial reports indicate that New York’s public facilities 
experienced approximately $1.4 billion in damage from the 
September 11 attack (Bram, Orr, and Rapaport 2002). This 
amount is approximately 1.5 percent of the city’s preexisting 
infrastructure stock (Haughwout and Inman 1996), implying a 
0.18 percent decline in city land values as a result of lost 
infrastructure, assuming that the losses are permanent.9 The 
losses, however, are unlikely to be permanent.
The importance of these facilities to New York City can be 
illustrated by way of a rough calculation of the value of the 
World Trade Center’s PATH station. With the destruction of 
that facility on September 11, some 20,000 New Jersey–Lower 
Manhattan commuters were forced to find alternate means of 
transportation to work. For some, this required a shift to more 
expensive ferries crossing the Hudson River from Hoboken, 
New Jersey. But for the substantial number who had 
commuted from the PATH station in Newark, New Jersey, the 
quickest option was to take a commuter rail to Pennsylvania 
Station in New York City and then a city subway to Lower 
Manhattan. New Jersey Transit, the state’s commuter line, 
estimates that daily ridership to Pennsylvania Station increased 
by 15,000 passengers following September 11, despite the 
immediate loss of jobs experienced (New Jersey Transit 2001).
For these riders, a twenty-two-minute ride from Newark to 
Lower Manhattan was replaced by a twenty-minute train ride 
to midtown plus a twenty-to-thirty-minute subway ride 
downtown, with a similar lengthening of the homeward 
commute. The additional time cost is thus approximately one 
hour per commuter per day. If we assume that 15,000 workers 
who value their commuting time at $25 per hour (half their 
hourly wage) are spending an additional hour per day 
commuting, we obtain a daily cost of $375,000, implying that 
the first year’s loss of the World Trade Center PATH station 
cost nearly $100 million in lost time.10 Thus, simply replacing 
the station would prevent this annual cost from becoming a 
perpetual loss, with a present value of nearly $2 billion.11
These calculations are intended to give an order-of-
magnitude estimate of the value of Lower Manhattan’s infra-
structure systems to the city and the region. In the short run, 
New Jersey commuters and their employers are paying the 
costs of this lost infrastructure, as workers must either spend 
less time at work or less time with their families and friends. 
Although it is less certain exactly who will gain the most, 
rebuilding the PATH station will clearly benefit the metro-
politan area’s economy as a whole. Moreover, any additional 
improvements to Lower Manhattan’s transportation linkages 
should further enhance the regional economy’s potential. 
As of this writing, the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey has publicly committed to rebuilding the PATH 
station, and the city has made substantial progress in repairing 
other damaged elements of the downtown infrastructure. 
Ensuring accessibility to established job centers in the region is 
thus a crucial policy challenge facing the city; doing so should 
reverse the initial negative effect of September 11 significantly.
Using Federal Compensation Effectively
Since the attack on the World Trade Center, much has been 
done to foster the recovery of New York City, and Lower 
Manhattan in particular. An outpouring of support nationwide 
has sought to provide spiritual and financial aid to the victims 
and to the city as a whole. Several blue-ribbon committees have 
been formed to assess the damage and monitor the progress 
made in rebuilding. To date, the federal government has 
committed $21.7 billion to the rebuilding effort. These funds 
will be allocated to various efforts to sustain and rebuild New 
York, ranging from subsidies to residential properties, to the 
accelerated depreciation of business plants and equipment, to 
the repair and reconstruction of local streets (New York City 
Independent Budget Office 2002).
It is therefore important to address the difficult question of 
the degree to which federal aid will help in the city’s recovery. 
The city is awaiting a final accounting of the unreimbursed 
losses before it can know with certainty what proportion 
of the losses the federal aid will offset. Nevertheless, a recent 
agreement among federal, state, and city officials should greatly 
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increase the flexibility in the allocation of federal aid for 
rebuilding. Specifically, roughly $9 billion has been set aside by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
earmarked for specific functions related to site cleanup, 
including debris removal, restoration of damaged public 
facilities and equipment, and police and fire department 
overtime. According to the New York City Independent Budget 
Office (2002), this overall funding allocation is likely to be far 
greater than the unreimbursed cleanup losses, including the 
cost of restoring damaged facilities and equipment, which are 
now estimated to be more on the order of $3 billion. Under the 
recent agreement, part of the remaining $6 billion of FEMA 
assistance can now be redirected to help rebuild and improve 
the entire transportation infrastructure in Lower Manhattan, 
including such projects as a new PATH terminal and a new 
transit center that would connect to the terminal and link the 
downtown subway lines. The use of FEMA funds for trans-
portation projects that go beyond the repair and restoration 
of damaged facilities is unprecedented.
These issues point to the third challenge facing city 
policymakers: to apply federal funds in the most efficient way 
possible to maximize their return. Overall, the federal aid 
package seems likely to cover the rebuilding costs of the 
physical facilities lost on September 11. There may even be 
sufficient funds, if applied judiciously, for Lower Manhattan to 
transform itself into an even more appealing location than it 
was on September 10. The proposed transportation improve-
ments, for example, could make Lower Manhattan a more 
desirable place for businesses, while subsidies to residential 
development could enhance the neighborhood’s various 
amenities.
Land Prices Suggest a Positive
Economic Outlook
In conjunction with the model, we can gain insight into the 
city’s longer term economic outlook by examining land 
prices.12 Although these prices cannot be observed directly, 
the selling prices of houses, apartments, and commercial 
properties can serve as a rough proxy.
In the days and weeks immediately following the terrorist 
attack, there was widespread concern that large numbers of 
people would no longer want to live in New York City. As it 
turns out, following a brief but sharp dip in September and 
October, housing markets in New York City’s nearby suburbs, 
the outer boroughs, and even Manhattan are reported to have 
rebounded strongly (Bram, Orr, and Rapaport 2002). As 
shown in Chart 3, the selling prices of existing homes 
throughout the metropolitan area have continued to rise, not 
only in absolute terms, but also relative to the national average.  
These results suggest that the terrorist attack thus far has had 
little if any negative effect on land prices, even in areas close to 
the World Trade Center.
Manhattan’s office market, however, has been more mixed. 
The rental market has clearly been weak: at midyear 2002, 
office vacancy rates were reported to be sharply higher than 
they were a year earlier and rents were reported to be sharply 
lower. However, the buyer’s market for office property 
continued to be characterized as strong, again suggesting 
underlying strength in land prices. 
Thus, conditions in New York’s important property 
markets currently appear to reflect continued strong demand. 
To the extent that business and household evaluations of a 
location’s prospects are reflected in bids, New York City’s land 
markets suggest a very positive indicator for the city. Naturally, 
market participants are operating with very limited infor-
mation about the future. Yet it appears that, from what they 
know, firms and households still view New York as an 
attractive location. Going forward, the strength of the city’s 
property markets will be an important barometer of its 
economy.
Conclusion
Economic growth in New York City for most of the past three 
decades has been characterized by a transformation of 
employment from relatively low-paying jobs to increasingly 
higher paying ones—that is, overall employment levels have 
remained roughly constant but real earnings levels have risen 
both in absolute terms and relative to the nation.
In light of the destruction that occurred on September 11, 
several downside risks to the city’s economic growth prospects 
have arisen. The worst-case scenario includes the possibility 
that financial firms located in Lower Manhattan will leave the 
city, which could generate a cumulative downward spiral of job 
and income growth.
Going forward, the strength of the city’s 
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In assessing this and other potential risks to New York, we 
examined the city’s economic position with respect to several 
key growth fundamentals prior to September 11. We found 
that New York’s industrial mix, which is weighted toward high-
growth sectors, along with the city’s attractiveness to workers 
and firms, point to favorable prospects for growth. However, 
whether these conditions translate into actual growth going 
forward depends to a large degree on the city’s policy response 
to the economic pressures arising from the terrorist attack. The 
main elements of this response will be the ability to manage 
relatively large budget deficits and rebuild New York City’s 
damaged and destroyed infrastructure—while maintaining the 
productivity of the capital stock. Addressing the latter issue will 
require a vision of Lower Manhattan’s role in the overall city 
economy as well as an efficient allocation of the anticipated 
federal aid.Endnotes
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1. By “relative,” we mean in comparison to other locations within the 
broad capital and labor market. In practice, the nation is a sensible 
benchmark, as national labor supply is relatively inelastic. Capital may 
be more elastically supplied at the national level, but in this context we 
take the national supply of capital as given.
2. This conclusion is also based on the assumption that higher prices 
of constant-quality housing reflect growth in demand for the land on 
which a house sits or for durable capital in place there, and that firms 
and households are competitors in the land market.
3. See Harrigan and Martin (2002) and Quigley (1998) for discussions 
of the local benefits of industry concentrations.
4. For example, for evidence on city schools’ math test scores, see
New York City Department of Education (2002).
5. Because of improvements in the relative skill level of New York City 
employers and residents over time, we must be cautious in inter-
preting any income data. If the local skill-adjusted wage is higher than 
it is elsewhere, it can be interpreted as evidence that firms are willing 
to pay relatively more to workers here, implying that these workers are 
more productive when they work in New York.
6. See Harrigan and Martin (2002).
7. Data refer to all persons twenty-five years of age and older. City data 
are from the U.S. Census Bureau (1991, 1999); national data are from 
the U.S. Census Bureau (2002). In 1991, the city’s college-educated 
share of the population was 22.1 percent, while the national share was 
21.3 percent in 1990 (U.S. Census Bureau 1991, 2002).
8. The lower figures in the range (for both years) are from the New 
York City Office of the Comptroller (2001); the higher figures are May 
2002 estimates from the New York City Office of Management and 
Budget, as reported by the U.S. General Accounting Office (2002).
9. Haughwout and Inman’s data are for 1992 and should thus be 
viewed as illustrative of the order of magnitude of the September 11 
attack.
10. The value-of-time estimate as half the gross hourly wage is 
standard in the urban transportation literature; see Small (1992).
11. These calculations exclude the additional out-of-pocket cost to 
New Jersey commuters, as these amounts are transfers to regional 
transportation authorities. Lost time, however, is gained by no one. 
Present-value calculations assume 3 percent real discount and
2 percent depreciation rates.
12. Bram, Orr, and Rapaport (2002) discuss current economic 
indicators since the attack in order to assess short-term prospects.References
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